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Abstract 
 
We present findings from a longitudinal, empirical 
study of online privacy policies. Our research found that 
although online privacy policies have improved in 
quality and effectiveness since 2000, they still fall well 
short of the level of privacy assurance desired by 
consumers. This study has identified broad areas of 
deficiency in existing online privacy policies, and offers 
a solution in the form of an holistic framework for the 
development, factors and content of online privacy 
policies for organizations. Our study adds to existing 
theory in this area and, more immediately, will assist 
businesses concerned about the effect of privacy issues 
on consumer web usage. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Information privacy is the legitimate collection, use 
and disclosure of personal information, or “the claims of 
individuals that data about themselves should generally 
not be available to other individuals and organizations, 
and that, where data is possessed by another party, the 
individual must be able to exercise a substantial degree of 
control over that data and its use” [1]. In our times, 
consumer online privacy concerns continue to flourish 
within an atmosphere of general distrust of institutions 
and fears of technology abuse [2, 3]. A recent survey 
identified the main concerns as intrusion, manipulation 
and discrimination; third party capture of personally 
identifiable information (PII); and identity theft and 
stalking [4].  
Online privacy, a significant factor in consumer trust, 
is increasingly being viewed as an imperative for e-
business success [3, 5]. However, its provision is often at 
odds with organizational goals—such as the 
maximization of personal information resource value 
obtained from disclosure to third parties (often for 
commercial gain) and the retention of customer loyalty 
via enhanced personalized services. Confounding this 
issue, user online privacy needs are frequently 
inconsistent with other important societal values, such as 
the free flow of information, public health and safety [6]. 
In attempting to resolve these conflicting perspectives, 
considerable effort has been expended seeking societal, 
organizational and technical solutions which can provide 
a balance of online privacy regarded as fair—from 
individual, societal and organizational perspectives.  
The online privacy policy (OPP) (or privacy 
statement) is a key organizational measure for assuring 
online privacy for web site users [7, 8, 9]. These policies 
articulate the collection, use and protection of user 
personal information, as well as the choices offered to 
users in exercising their rights in respect of the control of 
their own personal information. The policies are intended 
to represent fair information privacy practices, as first 
defined by the OECD [10], and later modified and 
extended by individual countries in order to 
accommodate perceived e-business and globalization 
demands [for example, 11, 12].  
To date, OPPs have a poor record in providing online 
protection. Studies conducted in the past few years 
revealed that significant proportions of US and 
Australian OPPs failed to comply with recognized fair 
information practice principles and overall, were 
ineffective [3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. These studies 
found that OPPs, terms of service, conditions of use and 
other online policies were frequently overlooked by users 
in their eagerness to gain access to online products and 
services. Typically, users either signaled consent to policy 
conditions without reading the policies, or declined them 
unread. Policies were frequently unclear—for example, 
they were ambiguous, couched in “legalese”, misleading 
or deceptive. More disturbingly, OPPs were found to be 
inconsistent with privacy practices, and poorly linked to 
business strategy and operations in general.  
A recent report indicating some improvement in the 
quality of US OPPs is interesting, in light of the 
controversial lack of privacy legislation in the US, where 
much has been expected from industry self-regulation 
combined with increased levels of public awareness, to 
effect desired changes [19]. Australian OPPs have also 
improved, according to one investigation in February, 
2001—a date well in advance of the recently enacted 
privacy legislation’s compliance deadline of December 
that year [20]. Nevertheless, in tandem with these 
positive indicators, well-publicized privacy violations 
continue to fuel public anxiety over privacy issues, with 
blame often ascribed in no small measure to ineffective 
OPPs [21, 22].  
In order to promote the effectiveness of OPPs and 
consumer confidence in them, a range of societal 
measures is available. Privacy enforcement via co-
regulation (for example, Australia) or self-regulation (for 
example, the US) are alternative approaches although, in 
the US, some type of legislation now appears inevitable 
[12, 23, 24]. A new focus was suggested by a recent poll, 
in which consumers identified “third party verification 
that a company’s privacy practices match its OPP” as the 
single greatest step a company could take toward 
securing consumer trust [3]. Existing verification 
mechanisms include privacy certification and seals such 
as TRUSTe and APCC [25], as well as independent 
audits.  
Technological support for OPPs is now available. A 
landmark development has been P3P, which enables 
consumers to view a translated version of a site’s OPP in 
a more usable form, and enables comparisons of 
consumer privacy preferences with the policy’s privacy 
levels [26]. However, critics have debated the limitations 
of this approach, and observe that to date, few companies 
have adopted this technology [27]. 
To complement societal and technological support for 
OPPs, organizational guidelines can be used. Although 
various sets of guidelines already exist, we believe there 
are very good reasons for developing new, improved 
guidelines. Existing guidelines [for example, 9, 11, 12] 
were not developed from empirical evidence, but were 
instead based on professional expertise, and may 
therefore have missed some of the issues in this 
peculiarly dynamic and complex area. Babu [14] reported 
that existing sets of guidelines possessed some, but not 
all, of the desired characteristics. Furthermore, recent 
evidence suggests that existing OPPs are ineffective in 
managing related risks, possibly due to deficiencies in 
current sets of guidelines [28].  
Some progress has been made in developing 
empirically grounded, organizational guidelines. For 
example, Anton and Earp [13] studied health privacy 
policies using a goal search approach, resulting in a 
taxonomy of OPPs—although this, however, did not 
account for contextual issues such as organizational and 
societal factors, and usability. 
In a companion paper, we presented the results of one 
part of a broad research project investigating online 
privacy policies—a high level set of organizational 
guidelines for OPPs [29].  In this paper, we present 
results and findings from a different part of the same 
research project. Here, our aim is to identify commonly 
found deficiencies in existing OPPs, and recommend 
organizational solutions. Guidelines for OPPs can be 
useful not only for developing OPPs, but also for 
identifying their weaknesses—by acting as an instrument 
for measuring policy quality, and highlighting trends and 
patterns suggesting the larger, often holistic problems—
which in turn, demand holistic solutions. We employ our 
set of guidelines to these ends, in this paper. 
Following this brief survey of the literature and 
current research into online privacy protection and the 
role of OPPs, we overview our research design. Next, we 
recap and summarize our guidelines for effective online 
privacy policy. Deficiencies in existing OPPs are then 
identified and analyzed. As the culmination of our study, 
we provide an holistic framework for online privacy 
policies. Finally, we review our work, and draw 
conclusions. 
 
2. Research Design 
 
This longitudinal study was conducted in two stages, 
two years apart. In 2000, a literature review yielded a 
first-cut conceptual model of guidelines for OPP, for the 
purpose of exploring the topic further [14]. A critical 
analysis of ten OPPs residing on the web sites of eight 
American businesses and two Australian businesses, was 
performed. The sites were chosen because they were 
dynamic, recognized e-business sites at the time of study, 
and because they featured substantial OPPs.  The sites 
were: ebay.com, cdnow.com, 247realmedia.com, 
colesonline.com.au, wishlist.com.au, travel.com, 
disney.com, toysmart.com, craftshop.com, and 
realnetworks.com. These constitute five retail, one 
auction services, one travel and three entertainment 
companies.  
First, the OPPs were evaluated for compliance with 
the first-cut guidelines in order to identify deficiencies, 
and as a strategy for discovering unexpected, novel and 
useful elements within existing OPPs which could later 
be incorporated in future revisions of guidelines. 
Guideline compliance was measured by its reasonable 
implementation within a policy.  
The policies were then analyzed contextually, by 
studying the influence of human computer interaction, 
organizational and human factors, as well as other issues, 
on the quality of the policies. A cross-policy analysis 
elicited trends, patterns and differences. To capture the 
relationship between an OPP and its organizational 
context, Babu [14] conducted an in-depth case study of a 
recognized Australian online retailer, termed OzeSale, 
via semi-structured interviews and document collection. 
As a result of these empirical investigations, Babu 
produced a revised, improved set of guidelines for OPP 
[14].  
In the second stage of this project—our extension in 
2002 of the original investigations from 2000—we 
reviewed the original as well as recent literature, 
reanalyzed the original research data, and reviewed the 
original guidelines and results. We then analyzed the 
nine still existing OPPs in their updated forms in April, 
2002 (including OzeSale’s site OPP), for guideline 
compliance and contextual issues—again identifying 
trends, patterns and differences. We thus arrived at a 
final set of guidelines for effective OPPs (Section 3), and 
identified major areas of deficiencies in current OPPs 
(Section 4), leading us to a solution in the form of an 
holistic framework for online privacy policies for 
organizations (Section 5). 
 
3. Organizational guidelines for online 
    privacy policy 
 
In Table 1, we summarize a comprehensive set of high 
level guidelines for online privacy policies, using the 
following categories: awareness, data quality, security, 
information movement, user identification, 
accountability, user access, assurance, contact, choice, 
change management, children’s privacy, sensitive 
information and exceptions (compiled from [11, 12, 13, 
14] and our own empirical studies).  
Our set of guidelines is intended as a map for 
businesses, to ensure that all important areas are 
addressed in the development of OPPs. The guidelines 
can also be utilized as a means for evaluating OPPs and 
identifying weaknesses which need addressing—a use for 
which we employ them in the next section. Note that not 
all guidelines included in our categorization are 
addressed by various sets of existing fair information 
practices and regulations, although our study suggests 
that all our guidelines are important, and therefore 
worthy of inclusion in our final set.  
By way of introduction, we briefly comment on the 
overall results of the longitudinal comparison of OPPs in 
the two different years (full details are in a forthcoming 
journal article, currently under review).  We found the 
OPPs for 2002 had generally improved in quality since 
2000. We attribute this positive trend primarily to an 
increased consciousness of online privacy issues within 
the e-business community, combined with the effects of 
privacy legislation or industry self-regulation based on 
recognized, fair information practices.  
Despite our finding of overall improvement, we 
nonetheless identified various deficiencies, in that many 
guidelines were inadequately addressed or missing in the 
OPPs studied in 2002 (as were many in 2000).  In the 
following section we discuss the main areas of deficiency 
in OPPs, arising from our investigations. We also 
highlight changes in the policies over the two year 
period.  
 
4. Deficiencies in online privacy policies 
 
We generalize in the following discussion only in 
order to highlight the problems. We point out that not 
every policy studied exhibited all of the weaknesses 
described below—but rather, that those deficiencies 
presented were the main types found across the policies, 
overall. 
4.1 User awareness 
Although companies have clearly made inroads since 
2000 into providing useful features and information in 
OPPs in order to assist users in becoming more aware of 
the privacy issues arising from site visits, there is still 
substantial room for improvement.  
The most fundamental type of awareness to provide is 
that of the importance and meaning of the OPP itself. 
Many people do not know what an online privacy policy 
(or privacy statement) is, nor realize its significance, and 
may overlook it for these reasons. Sites currently provide 
little awareness of the importance of this policy, nor do 
they direct users to it. “Terms of agreement” are often 
highlighted at the commencement of a site visit, although 
the OPP is rarely drawn to the user’s attention.   
At the next level, all sites (in both 2000 and 2002) 
provided a basic awareness of the policy’s existence and 
 
Table 1.  Summary of guidelines for online privacy policy  
(compiled from [11, 12, 13, 14] and our own additional studies) 
 
Online Privacy Policy 
Guideline Category 
Brief Description of Guideline 
Category 
Guideline Within Category 
 
 1. Awareness The site should facilitate user  
awareness of its privacy policies. 
1.1 Prominence/openness 
1.2 Language 
1.3 Notification 
1.4 Classification 
1.5 Collection 
1.6 Purpose/use 
1.7 Disclosure 
1.8 Consumer education 
1.9 Third party involvement 
2. Data quality Personal information should be 
maintained as complete, timely and 
accurate, by the company. 
 
3. Security Personal information should be  
secured wherever possible. 
3.1 Data security 
3.2 Data transmission 
3.3 Cookies 
4. Information movement Details of personal privacy provided  
in various states of information  
movement should be provided to the 
user. 
4.1 Information monitoring 
4.2 Information aggregation 
4.3 Information storage 
4.4 Information transfer 
4.5 Information disposal 
4.6 Information personalization 
4.7 Transborder data flow 
5. User identification Use and disclosure of a user’s 
site identifier as either PII, anonymous, 
pseudonymous, should be stated. 
5.1 User identifier 
5.2 Anonymity 
5.3 Pseudonymity 
5.4 Nonrepudiation 
6. Accountability Company and user should be held 
accountable for actions. 
6.1 Enforcement 
6.2 User responsibilities 
7. User access Users should have opportunity to 
participate in their personal information 
protection as necessary. 
7.1 User access and self-correction 
7.2 User access to other user data 
8. Assurance Policies should state ways in which 
companies assure users they are  
following their OPPs in practice. 
8.1 User recourse 
8.2 Verification 
8.3 Consequences 
9. Contact Policies should state how, and for 
what purpose, organizations contact  
users using PII to make the contact. 
 
10. Choice The user should be given choices 
with respect to collection and use of  
personal information. 
10.1 Consent 
11. Change management Companies require procedures for 
change management of OPPs. 
11.1 Evolution 
11.2 Changes to policy 
11.3 Change of company control 
12. Children’s Privacy The policy should provide information 
regarding access by, and involvement 
of, children. 
 
13. Sensitive information The ways in which sensitive 
information (eg religion) is treated 
differently to other personal information, 
should be explained. 
 
14. Exceptions Exceptions to the OPP policy should be 
clearly stated. 
 
 
how to locate it, via conspicuous links to the OPPs on 
each page, in a consistent position. However, on 
occasions when privacy threats are more likely to 
occur— either with or without the user’s awareness of 
the imminence of the threat (for example, on those 
occasions when personal information is being 
requested)—only a few sites provided prominent links to 
their OPPs (for example, in a position adjacent to data 
collection boxes). This still represents an improvement 
since 2000, when none of the sites provided this facility. 
The quality of the language expression provided by 
OPPs needs far more attention. Currently in seven out of 
nine sites, the English is too complex, and replete with 
“legalese”, ambiguity, inconsistencies, confusion and use 
of the words “most”, “many”, etc—all of which can be 
used to hide exceptions which are not subject to the same 
rules. Many users do not understand the particular 
meaning of privacy terms used, for example, 
“disclosure”. The net effect is to hide the facts from the 
users, rather than making them aware of how their 
personal privacy is really being handled.  
OPPs do not fully inform users about personal 
information collected, although small improvements 
since 2000 were observed in this regard. Eight out of 
nine policies in 2002 did not provide complete lists of 
personal information that might be collected during site 
visits (nor indeed at later stages, via tracking through 
cookies, or code secretly stored on user computers)—
hiding behind conditional clauses such as “Depending on 
what you purchase, we may also need to collect other 
personal information, like your clothing size..”. None of 
the policies fully informed users of the purposes of such 
data collection, instead using general clauses such as, 
“We use that information to service your account and to 
personalize your experience at ...”. Finally, eight out of 
nine policies did not articulate the different third parties 
to whom personal information is disclosed, nor the 
purposes and uses of information so disclosed by those 
third parties, once they have the information in their 
possession.  
Confounding the user about disclosure practices was 
common to most policies.  In one OPP we found, “We'll 
never share that information with third parties interested 
in e-mailing you”. This, of course, did not preclude 
collected personal information from being shared with 
third parties with interests other than e-mailing the 
user—for example, placing pop-up advertisements on the 
user’s computer screen. Most policies did not provide 
enough information about the level of protection afforded 
at third party sites linked to by the site, as well as at other 
third parties with whom personal information could be 
shared at some future time. We address third party 
involvement as an important issue in its own right, later 
in this section.  
 Consumer education for the purpose of increasing 
user awareness of online privacy issues is currently very 
limited indeed, and we discuss this important issue 
separately also, later in this section. 
 
4.2 Usability issues 
 
OPPs pay scant attention to usability issues, which are 
always important to the effectiveness of user interfaces, 
and particularly so in privacy interfaces [14, 30, 31]. 
Usability has been identified as an important factor in all 
types of online policies for the securing of consumer trust 
[32, 33]. As mentioned in Section 4.1, we found all the 
OPPs in 2002 to be confusing, ambiguous and difficult to 
follow, in places. Most policies used “legalese”, and most 
were poorly structured with respect to indexing or 
navigation. Overall, the policies exhibited poorly 
designed human computer interfaces—some more so 
than others. There was still noticeable improvement since 
2000, however, when the language and layout were 
significantly worse in almost all the policies.  
 
4.3 Threats, risks and vulnerabilities  
 
OPPs typically neglect to articulate online privacy 
threats, provide a risk assessment for these, or provide 
information about the vulnerabilities of the users’ 
personal information to privacy threats, although such 
information would clearly be of great interest to users. 
Almost all the policies analyzed did not provide these 
features either in 2000 or 2002, suggesting that much 
improvement is still needed in this area. We did, 
however, discover several exceptions in our study. Most 
notably, eBay featured a vulnerabilities scenario analysis 
which provides useful information in this respect.   
 
4.4 User roles and responsibilities 
 
Very little information about user roles and 
responsibilities is provided in policies. Some 
improvements in this area have taken place in the two 
years since the earlier study, indicating that companies 
are now more aware of this important aspect of OPPs, 
however there is still room for much improvement. In 
some policies, users are advised to safeguard their 
passwords, and to sign off and close browsers at the end 
of accessing the sites. In most cases, significant user roles 
and responsibilities (with respect to managing their 
online privacy) are not stated in the OPP but instead are 
found in other online policies, such as “terms of use”.  
Finally, we believe it would be very difficult for users to 
identify their responsibilities with respect to managing 
their online privacy in current OPPs, as the various 
specified user responsibilities are spread throughout the 
policies, in piecemeal fashion. 
 
4.5 Control and choice 
 
According to all the OPPs studied in both 2000 and 
2002, users are not in control of their personal 
information. At present, all the companies studied 
exercise almost all the control, a situation which is 
unlikely to engender user confidence. In particular, all 
the studied sites’ users lack sufficient, consistent choice 
(consent) opportunities, with respect to the provision, 
disclosure or use of their personal information. Most 
policies offer complex combinations of opt-out and opt-
in, which can be confusing.  Furthermore, choice/consent 
is sometimes offered covertly, for example, “By using ... 
and providing us with your personal information, you are 
accepting the privacy practices described in this policy 
statement”.  Encouragingly, the amount of choice 
provided in 2002 had increased significantly in almost 
all policies, since 2000. 
 
4.6 Data quality 
 
Although in all policies in both years, users were 
offered some type of access to OPPs for the purpose of 
checking and correcting their personal information, in 
most cases the user was only provided with contact 
details, rather than an online form to update 
immediately. Furthermore, all responsibility for data 
quality assurance appeared to be with the user, with none 
guaranteed by the company, other than assurances 
relating to the security of collected personal information.  
Regarding security, five OPPs in 2000—increasing to 
all nine in 2002—provided some type of commitment to 
data security, indicating use of SSL, firewalls and other 
technologies, with corresponding symbols such as 
padlocks, on the sites. General security assurance 
statements were commonly found, for example, “We 
employ many different security techniques to protect 
such data from unauthorized access by users inside and 
outside the company”, while general disclaimers were 
popular, for example, “However, perfect security does not 
exist on the Internet” and “…does not ensure or warrant 
the security of any information you transmit to us or 
from our online products or services, and you do so at 
your own risk”.  
By 2002, two of the OPPs listed extensive security 
provisions, while other sites had added to theirs. For 
example, one OPP assured: the use of secure connections 
from customer browser to company site, encryption for 
sensitive personal information, logical security of 
databases on company systems, access restrictions to 
such databases, employee corporate data confidentiality 
contracts, and quality assurance procedures to ensure 
product development did not compromise existing 
privacy protection. We view this as a promising trend. 
 
4.7 Links to privacy practices 
 
The only overt linkages between the OPP and actual 
business privacy practices were the presence in 2002, on 
seven of the sites, of privacy seals (for example, 
TRUSTe)—of which only five had been present in 2000. 
In our case study of OzeSale in 2000, there appeared to 
be very little connection between policy and actual 
practices—a clear cause for concern. Normally, company 
policies are translated into procedures which are 
documented and then followed, thereby facilitating not 
only correct implementation of the policies, but also 
future audits and reviews. It was not clear from the 
policies that this translation to procedures was occurring 
and indeed, at OzeSale, it was not.  
We also observed, through our study of OzeSale, some 
indication as to why organizations may not be following 
their online privacy policies in practice (many such 
policy violations have been widely reported). It appears 
that privacy infrastructures within companies are not yet 
powerful enough, or sufficiently developed to enforce 
their privacy policies inside the companies themselves, 
although this may be changing with the recent trend 
toward establishing organizational Privacy Officer 
functions and privacy certification via annual audits.   
 
4.8 Consumer education 
There is a lack of understanding of the issues provided 
by policies, for consumers. For example, consumers 
cannot find answers from existing OPPs to the following 
questions: “What are online privacy policies?”, “What 
will happen if I ignore them?”, “Are privacy statements 
and terms of use the same things?”, “What does 
personally identifiable information mean?”, “What is 
third party disclosure?”, “Can someone find me from my 
personally identifiable information?”—and much more.  
In 2000, only one policy provided links to educational 
and consumer privacy sites for consumer education, 
while this number rose to four policies in 2002. However, 
we believe that much more than mere links to external 
informational sites is needed. 
4.9 Flow of personal information 
 
Cookies used for monitoring or tracking purposes 
were given only cursory, unsatisfying explanations in all 
policies. This situation remained unchanged between 
2000 and 2002. Sites often make some commitment to 
explaining their use of cookies as a form of monitoring 
or tracking for the purpose of better serving the user, 
although the user isn’t given a genuine choice much of 
the time to refuse cookies—because, without them, many 
site features simply will not be provided. We feel this is 
an unethical business practice, as the user will be all too 
often easily swayed into accepting the cookies in order to 
obtain the desired services. 
 
Information about personal information aggregation, 
storage, transfer, disposal and personalization is scanty, 
missing or exhibits other problems, appearing in few 
policies in both 2000 and 2002, as follows. There are 
inconsistencies—for example, one policy stated in one 
section that anonymous (i.e. non PII, such as IP address) 
information would not be linked to the user’s PII without 
their consent (i.e. there was choice), while in another 
section, the policy stated that it would in future be 
considering giving the user a choice as to whether the 
anonymous information collected could be linked to PII, 
as currently the information could be linked (i.e. there 
was no user choice). There are omissions—for example, 
regarding information storage, only data quality or 
security issues were addressed in policies, and the 
duration of storage was not made explicit in most cases, 
in either year. There was cause for concern—for 
example, “Information collected at this site may be 
disclosed to third parties where functions are being 
outsourced”. There were generalities and vagueness—for 
example, “information collected is used to provide the 
customer with better service”.   
Transborder personal information flow was only 
addressed by a few policies in both years, and even then, 
the advices were merely disclaimers. Users of all policies 
studied would not be aware of the level of personal 
information protection afforded should their information 
move across a state or national border into another legal 
jurisdiction, unless they carried out their own 
investigations. 
 
4.10 Change management 
 
Users are unable to consult their OPP history with 
respect to a particular site. We did not find even one OPP 
which provided this facility in our study—a deficiency 
bound to engender user anxiety eventually, especially 
once related incidents are published in the popular media 
with greater frequency.  In a recent case involving 
Hotmail, many users were startled to discover they had 
unwittingly given their permissions—through earlier 
incarnations of Hotmail’s OPP—for their personal 
information to be disclosed to third parties [22]. Yet 
some of these users were convinced they had never given 
such permissions.  
An increasing trend we observed is for companies to 
update their policies frequently, making it even more 
difficult for consumers to keep abreast of changes.  
 
4.11 Relationship to other company policies 
 
There is a great deal of confusion for a user who is 
attempting to ascertain the relationship between the OPP 
and other online and offline company policies. There 
were no answers in any of the OPPs studied, or in other 
areas of sites, to questions such as: “What is the 
relationship between an organization’s (offline) privacy 
policy and its OPP?” and “What is the relationship 
between the OPP and other online policies such as: terms 
of use, legal policy and security policy?”   
At present, businesses appear to be dumping their 
OPPs online merely by mirroring their existing offline 
forms, chunked into slightly smaller screen packets 
accessible via links from an initial list of topic 
headings—or worse, presented as a lengthy online 
document, which the user has to scroll down (tiresomely) 
to read in its entirety. Offline company policies were not 
designed to suit human computer interfaces. We also 
note here that a policy noticeably absent from all sites 
studied was an online Code of Ethics, which a site user 
may find useful to consult, and which could increase user 
trust in the company visited.  
 
4.12 Data transmission vulnerabilities 
Users were not informed in either year about specific 
data transmission threats such as interception, 
eavesdropping and masquerading, in any of the policies. 
However by 2002, most of the policies issued a 
disclaimer to the effect that security transmitted across 
the Internet is never, and could never be, 100% secure, 
and therefore information in transmission will always be 
vulnerable. 
4.13 Third party privacy protection 
 
Although most of the sites summarized privacy 
protection information about third party sites linked to, 
as well as about third parties to whom information could 
be disclosed by the company through private negotiations 
(i.e. third parties not hyperlinked to the site)—the 
information provided was often just a disclaimer, rather 
than any kind of assurance. Interestingly, the number of 
policy disclaimers in 2002 regarding privacy levels at 
linked third party sites had doubled since 2000, from four 
to eight policies, however more than mere disclaimers is 
needed. Disclaimers in 2002 tended towards 
“encouraging” users to consult third party policies.  
 
4.14 User identification 
 
User identification issues about the use and disclosure 
of a user’s site identifier as either PII, anonymous, or 
pseudonymous, were not addressed by most policies in 
either year—and in the few policies where they were 
addressed, were poorly explained.  
 
4.15 User recourse 
 
Most policies provide little information about the 
types of grievances consumers may have, and when it 
would be appropriate to contact the company regarding 
these. The methods of contact provided are not always 
convenient for the user. For example, a policy listing a 
US phone number when the user is located in Australia, 
is clearly inconvenient and inappropriate from the user 
perspective. The OPPs in our study did not address how 
the companies would incur sanctions if they failed to 
comply with their policies. 
 Other recourse was provided by the presence of 
privacy seals such as TRUSTe (refer Section 4.7). Where 
a seal is on a site—for example, the Australian Privacy 
Seal—the consumer can complain to a representative 
about a perceived policy infringement, and the seal can 
be revoked if the company has indeed breached policy.  
 
5. An holistic approach to online privacy  
    policy 
 
We observed throughout our study, as well as in our 
analysis of deficiencies in the previous section, the 
interplay of many different types of factors in the topic 
area of OPP.  In recent years, there has been a growing 
recognition of the need for holistic security and system 
solutions which integrate the human, social, 
organizational and technical issues [8, 34, 35]. On 
reviewing the many diverse issues raised in the 
guidelines as well as in the analysis of deficiencies in the 
previous section, we propose an holistic framework for 
online privacy policy (Figure 1) comprising three sets of 
guidelines—a set of factors to be considered when 
developing the policy, a method for the development of 
the policy, and a set of guidelines for the content of the 
policy (Table 1).   
Our framework is an adaptation of the framework for 
e-business security policy developed by Lichtenstein [8]. 
The original framework for e-business security policy 
included the online privacy policy as a sub-policy of the 
e-business security policy, suggesting that the framework 
may well be adaptable for use with online privacy 
policies.  
Currently, we have not developed models for the 
components shown in Figure 1—except for the Content 
model, which is represented by our set of guidelines 
(Table 1). Clearly, an online privacy risks model which 
articulates the range of potential online privacy risks to 
be considered when developing the policy, would be 
useful—while individual models for the different types of 
factors depicted in the Factors model (organizational, 
administrative, legal, societal, technical, standards and 
human issues) would also play a helpful role in enabling 
businesses to identify all the important issues that need to 
be taken into account in OPP development.  
The unique position of the Human Issues in the 
Factors model is deserving of special comment. In the 
work of Lichtenstein [8] it was found that the various 
non-human issues in all types of e-business security 
policies needed to be viewed through the lens of the 
important human issues involved. This research study 
suggests that the same is true for online privacy 
policies—with technologies, administrative, 
organizational and other issues, all needing to be 
tempered by the diverse needs of the all important 
individuals for whom the privacy is being provided, 
before appropriate sub-policies can be developed. 
Figure 1 includes a model for the development of the 
OPP in the top left hand corner, and includes a risk 
assessment of online privacy risks as they impact the 
specific business privacy data, in order to identify the 
significant online privacy risks to be addressed by the 
policy.  Other factors (from the Factors model) are also 
taken into account, as are the structure provided by the 
OPP content model (our guidelines in Table 1) and the 
integration of existing company policies (“org policies” 
and “e-business security policy (ESP)” in the diagram)—
in order to develop the OPP. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have reviewed the issues in online 
protection via focusing on online privacy policies, and 
summarized a set of high level organizational guidelines 
for companies to utilize in the development of an OPP. 
We provided a descriptive analysis of the deficiencies 
observed in Australian and US OPPs in 2000 and 2002, 
which companies can use to improve their policies in the 
future.  
As the culmination of this stage of our research 
project, we proposed an holistic framework for online 
privacy policy—which incorporates our guidelines as the 
basis of a structure for the OPP, and includes a risk-based 
method for developing the policy, as well as a model of 
the types of factors to be considered in policy 
development. We suggest this framework would prove 
useful to businesses in its current form, but far more so 
when developed to a greater depth. Currently, it is a very 
preliminary piece of research, requiring further 
exploration and refinement.  
Although our results were limited to a longitudinal 
study of nine policies over two years and a single case 
study—and of course we cannot generalize from this 
small sample of data—our results indicate there has been 
a small but significant improvement in the quality of 
OPPs over the period 2000-2002, which we attribute to 
increased public awareness of the issues, combined with 
co-regulation (Australia) or industry self-regulation (US).  
Nevertheless, there is still a significant shortfall 
between policies, and the requirements for such policies 
as indicated by our guidelines. Businesses need to set as a 
priority the improvement of their online privacy policies 
for a multitude of reasons—including raising ethical 
business standards online, “doing the right thing” by 
their online customers, and securing the elusive 
consumer trust that can yield e-business success. Privacy 
is an area of considerable concern to many online 
consumers [3], and those companies which provide 
adequate support for their customers’ privacy—and 
particularly those which present this information in an 
effective manner—increase the likelihood of consumer 
loyalty.  As safety is the crucial issue today for airlines, 
so may privacy become for online businesses in the next 
decade.  
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Figure 1. Framework for Online Privacy Policy  
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